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Abstract
We analyze number agreement in English in the version of Situa-
tion Semantics I put forth in [1]. We propose two theoretical notions,
agreement target situations and relevance of situations. We propose
that structural constraints shift the former in a way governed by the
latter. Our analysis shows that number agreement reflects our knowl-
edge about the structure of the world and the speaker's interests in
the discourse.
1 Introduction
In [1] I put forth a situation-semantic theory of plurality and other phenom-
ena. The purpose of the present paper is to construct a particular application
of the above theory to number agreement in English.' After briefly surveying
and augmenting [1] (section 2), we propose two theoretical notions, agree-
ment target situations and relevance of situations, with which we analyze
number agreement in English. We propose that structural constraints shift
agreement target situations in a way governed by the relevance of situations.
After introducing these mechanisms (section 3), we discuss examples where
the subjects are plural in number but the verbs exhibit singular agreement
(section 4). Our analysis will lead us to the conclusion (section 5) that num-
ber agreement reflects our knowledge about the structure of the world and
the speaker's interests in the discourse.
2 Theoretical Backgrounds
In [1], lattice-theoretic structure of atomic and non-atomic individuals ([2])
is relativised to situations (see also [3]). Thus, something may be atomic in
one situation and non-atomic in another. For example, in (1), let X be the
subject's referent, r be the resource situation of the subject, and r be the
described situation of the whole sentence.
(1) Two boys annoyed Carol.
X is non-atomic in r. Whether (1) is read collectively or distributively
depends on whether X is non-atomic in s too.
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However, as it stands this analysis has one flaw. Suppose that (2) obtains.
We will want to say that X is plural (non-atomic) in s, i.e. X has members
in s. Let x 1 be one of these members. Then, [1] would predict that (3)
follows from (2), which is clearly undesirable.
(2) s	 people, X
(3) s	 people, xi
We augment [1] by extending lattice structures to infons. For example, in
order for (5) to be a resolution of (4), it is not necessarily required that
P1 ,	 ,	 P; when it isn't the case that 131 ,	 , Pn = P, whether (5)
counts as a resolution of (4) depends on what P1 ,	 , P, and P are.
(4) s	 P, X
(5) s	 s
where x 1 , ..., x, , are the members of X in s.
(2) is to be resolved to (6) (a people infon is the sum of a set of person infons
whose person arguments are different from each other); (3) then doesn't
follow from (2).
(6) s	 person, x i >>,	 s	 person, xn,
Examples like the following (from [4]) could complicate the infon lattice
structure.
(7) a. Your problem and mine are similar.
b. Your problem is similar to mine and mine is similar to yours.
In (7a), we have s	 similar, X >>. Although our theory doesn't neces-
sarily require this, but assume that X is the sum of x 1 and x2 in s. Then we
could say that << similar, X is the sum of << similar-to, x 1 , x2	and
<< similar-to, x 2 , x1 >> in s. That is, both (7a–b) are statements about s.2
Now, when we want to say that a given expression X agrees with some-
thing else Y in number, we first have to choose a situation in order to decide
Y's number specification for agreement purposes. This question motivates
our first proposed notion, agreement target situation.
3 Agreement Target and Target Transfer
Let's say Y's referent is atomic in s i and non-atomic in s 2 . Suppose X agrees
with Y in number. If we choose s 1 , we will get singular agreement, in which
case we say s i is the agreement target situation (hereafter, abbreviated as
agreement target, or ATS). That is, Y provides s i to X so that X agrees
with the number specification of Y in s i . In contrast, if we choose s 2 , we
will get plural agreement, in which case we call s 2 the ATS.
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Since we distinguish the subject's resource situation from the described
situation of the whole sentence, the first question to be asked is: which is to
serve as the ATS, in general? In [1], the overt number specification of the
subject mirrors the (non-)atomicity in the resource situation, whereas the
(non-)atomicity in the described situation mirrors the collective/distributive
distinction (where "distributive" encompasses cases such as They are nice
people, where people(X) "distributes" to person(x 2 ), for 1 i n). Then,
according to the conventional "subject-verb agreement" locution, the re-
source should be the ATS, a natural position that we take.
This already gives us a straightforward account of (8).
(8) Ken and Naomi are/ pis a nice couple.
Let X be the subject's referent. The point is that the overt form of the sub-
ject dictates that X is non-atomic, whereas the postcopular phrase overtly
dictates that it is atomic, which is a contradiction. This puzzle is resolved in
our analysis. (8) says something like (9), where X comes with the restriction
10).
(9) s < nice, X >> e couple, X ED << one, X
(10) r	 members, {K, N}, X
s is the described situation, which is X's couple situation (see [1]), while r
is the subject's resource situation. Since X has the property of being 'one'
in s, it can't have members in s (i.e. X is a single entity as a couple; again,
see [1]). In contrast, X does have members in r; nothing forces s to inherit
X's membership from r or r to inherit X's atomicity from s.
However, things are not this simple, in fact. Consider (11) from [6].
(11) The couple is/are spending its/their honeymoon in Hawaii.
The first point to be noted is that plural subject-verb agreement is possible
even when the subject's referent is atomic in its resource situation. 4 If our
last word was that the subject's resource situation serves as the ATS, then
we would end up wrongly excluding this possibility. The obvious reason why
are is possible here is that any couple consists of two people. The second
point to be noted is that the subject-pronoun agreement has to coincide with
the subject-verb agreement; when you choose is, you have to choose its, but
when you choose are, you have to choose their.5
We propose that structural constraints shift agreement target situations.
For example, the relevant constraint here is something like the following.6
(12) (s i	couple, x >>)	 (82	 members, x, {x 1 , x 2 } >>)
In general, given a structural constraint of the form:
(13) (s i
	p)	 (s2	 q)
3
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and that the resource situation of the subject of a sentence is s i , (13) shifts
the ATS from s 1 to s2 so that the verb agrees with the number specification
of the subject's referent in s 2 instead of in s i , but this occurs only when s2
is conceived as a relevant situation in the discourse.
Now, consider (11). The subject's resource situation corresponds to s1
in (12). First, suppose that s 2 is relevant. Then (12) shifts the ATS from
s i to 3 2 , in which case we observe plural agreement. Next, suppose that s2
is not relevant. Then (12) isn't "activated" to shift the ATS, in which case
S i is the ATS and we observe singular agreement. This is our expression
of the intuition [4] that, in the case of collective nouns, the choice between
singular and plural agreement "is based, if on anything, on whether the
group is being considered as a single undivided body, or as a collection of
individuals" (p.177). In our formulation, the couple is always conceived as
a single entity; the difference resides in whether its membership aspect is
relevant or not.
In general, it is intuitive to say that the described situation of the whole
clause is relevant; thus, when s 2 and the described situation can be iden-
tified, ATS shift becomes obligatory. Then, we predict that (11) exhibits
plural agreement if something like Ken is spending his honeymoon in Hawaii
and Naomi is spending her honeymoon in Hawaii are also facts in the de-
scribed situation (i.e. if the couple's honeymoon-spending is the sum of
Ken's honeymoon-spending and Naomi's); in contrast, if (11) exhibits sin-
gular agreement then the couple is atomic in the described situation.' 8
Further, the coincidence of verbal agreement and pronominal agreement
follows. In (12), the described situation, which is identified with 3 2 in (13), is
the same throughout the whole close. Then, s 2 is either relevant throughout
the clause or irrelevant throughout the clause; then, shift occurs throughout
or doesn't occur throughout.9
Also note that ATS shift can occur only in the direction dictated by a
constraint. For example, let X be a couple. ATS shift is possible from X's
couple situation to its membership situation (the member's individuals
situation), as in (11), because we have the constraint (12) saying that X's
being a couple means X's having two persons as its members. But shift in
the other direction is not possible; that's why, in (8), we can't shift the ATS
from the subject's resource situation to Ken and Naomi's couple situation
and make the copula exhibit singular agreement.
4 Discussion
[8] notes that the collective/distributive distinction correlates with number
agreement. For example, they note that the plural agreement example (14a)
possesses distributive reading that is unavailable with (14b).
(14) a. Unleashed dogs on city sidewalks threaten the health and welfare
of law-abiding citizens.
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b. Unleashed dogs on city sidewalks threatens the health and welfare
of law-abiding citizens.
This might seem to suggest that ATS is obligatory in such cases. How-
ever, we have no obvious constraint in examples like (14). Further, even if we
stipulated some constraint, it would be unclear why the consequent situation
always has to be relevant in such cases (so that ATS shift becomes oblig-
atory and the number agreement coincides with the collective/distributive
distinction), while this is not the case in examples like (15).
(15) Kim and Sandy are/*is carrying the piano upstairs (together).
In fact, the accounts I suggest for examples like (14) are independent not
only from structural constraints but also from ATS shift. In other words,
in examples like (14), no ATS shift is involved and the resource situations
serve as the ATS.
The account I suggest for (14) is very simple. In (14a), dogs is the head
of the subject, and hence, we observe plural agreement. However, in (14b),
in, not dogs, is the head; in other words, the subject of (14b) is in fact a so-
called small clause (in [8]'s framework, on in (14b) is P[ -i-PRDD. Then, the
subject of (14b) is singular in the resource situation; it denotes an infon or a
proposition, and hence, it is only natural that we observe singular agreement
and that it is read collectively. Note that this account also accounts for (16)
(also from [8]), where the subject can't be analyzed as a small clause by any
means and hence plural agreement is required.
(16) *Raccoons is getting to be a problem in this neighborhood.
Further I assume that, when we say that something A can threaten some-
thing B, we mean that A is threatening because it is A. With this in mind, I
assume that the resource situations of the subjects are part of the described
situations in (14a-b) (in contrast, in examples like (15), the subject's re-
source situations do not necessarily have to be part of the described situ-
ations). This means that the referent of (14a)'s subject is plural not only
in the resource but also in the described situation; this is why (14a) is read
distributively.1°
Another example [8] uses to motivate the correlation is (17), where we
observe similar interpretational difference to (14) (see also [3], p.478, fn.7).
(17) a. Doing phonology problems and drinking vodka make me sick.
b. Doing phonology problems and drinking vodka makes me sick.
Interestingly, this pair could be used as an attack to [8]'s own framework
(which doesn't assume PRO) and own claim that agreement is not syntactic,
for we could analyze (17a-b) as (18a-b) respectively; the subject of (18a)
is a coordination of two clauses while that of (18b) is a single clause (this
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analysis assumes that the crucial reason for the contrast in (17) is that the
subjects are "property-denoting" expressions).11
(18) a. [[PRO doing phonology problems] and [PRO drinking vodka]
make me sick.
b. [PRO [doing phonology problems and drinking vodka]]
make me sick.
Then, Pollard and Sag should have shown that this analysis is not a real
solution to the contrast in (17) (otherwise it could be used as a support for
assuming PRO and that agreement is syntactic).
I suggest that, in fact, the above syntactic analysis is not a real solution.
My suggestion is that the real crucial factor is that the subjects of (17a—b),
which are coordinated VP's (or S's if PRO is to be assumed; see below),
count as abstract nouns. That is, the real observational generalization is
that coordinated abstract nouns allow singular/plural alternation and the
alternation correlates with the collective/distributive distinction. This gen-
eralization covers the similar interpretational contrast in examples like (19)
([3]), for which nobody would assume PRO.' 13
(19) Peanut butter and jelly is/are good for making sandwiches.
Thus, the PRO analyses (18a—b) are not the right solution to the contrast
in (17a—b).
Here, I assume the following constraint.14
(20) (S i <non-atomic,X >>)	 (32 <atomic,X >>)
where X is the sum of the referents of abstract nouns.
(20) says that if there is a sum of two or more abstract things in some
situation, then this sum can show up as a single complex thing in another
situation. We could say that (20) is a stipulation, but it explains both (17)
and (19) uniformly. For example, let X be the sum of doing phonology
problems and drinking vodka. In (17), X is non-atomic in the subject's
resource situation s i . Now, if X is atomic in the described situation, in which
case the sentence is read collectively, s 2 can be equated with the described
situation and hence ATS is shifted; thus, we observe singular agreement.
On the other hand, if X is non-atomic in the described situation, then we
are talking about its non-atomic aspect, and hence, s 2 is irrelevant. Thus,
ATS doesn't shift, and we observe plural agreement. Similarly for (19).15
Also note that coordinated sentential subjects also follow this pattern, as
the following examples from [14] (p.110) show (if PRO is to be assumed this
is expected from our analysis of (17)).
(21) a. That the price of gas went up and that the price of gold went down
isn't surprising.
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b. That the price of gas went up and that the price of gold went down
aren't surprising.
For the contrast in (21), we only have to assume that sentential subjects
also count as abstract nouns, while the PRO analysis' has nothing to say
about this.
In this connection, consider the following example from [3].
(22) Reading and writing at the same time is/*are hard work.
The point is that at the same time forces both collective reading and singular
agreement. The explicit semantics of such adjuncts is beyond the scope of
this paper, but at least we will have to say anyway that, while it forces us to
talk about reading and writing as a single activity (that is, about its singular
aspect), we also have to ensure that it can't attach to expressions denoting
"atomic" activities or events; thus, it doesn't seem enough simply to say
that reading and writing is conceived as a single activity or events.
Instead of writing a separate structural constraint, I suggest here that
the semantic value of at the same time itself incorporates the above require-
ments. That is, its semantic contribution is to operate on such constraints
as (20), in which X is non-atomic in the antecedent, and raise the relevance
of 3 2 in (20).
5 Conclusion
The crucial ingredients of our analysis of number agreement are [1]'s idea
that number specification is relative to situations and that structural con-
straints can shift agreement target situations. Further, target shift is con-
strained by the relevance of situations, which often mirrors the collective/
distributive distinction. Now, structural constraints represent our knowledge
about the structure of the world, and relevance of situations are reflections
of the speaker's interests in the discourse. Thus, our analysis claims that
number agreement reflects our knowledge and interests.17
Notes
*I would like to thank Bill Ladusaw (for his native judgments on some of
the examples) and Wataru Nakamura (for helping with obtaining another
speaker's native judgments on other examples).
l We follow [1] in distinguishing (in)definite descriptions from generalized
quantifiers. We ignore the latter throughout in this paper.
2 Cf. Dowty's characterization of the semantic effect of all mentioned on
p.154 of [5].
3 The semantic contribution of the adjective nice is situated in X's couple
situation. This means that X is said to be nice as a couple. Similarly, one
is situated, meaning that X is a single entity as a couple. See [1]).
'This point can be more clearly seen in the following examples from [7].
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(i) a. *These term is/are going to win.
b. This team is/are going to win.
The determiner has to be singular, whereas the verb can be either singular
or plural (I don't discuss the analysis by [7], only parts of which I have a
copy of).
'Similar examples are found on p.87 of [8].
6Those readers who want to regard structural constraints as relations
between situation types can assume that (12) is "generated" by a structural
constraint conceived as a relation between situation types.
'Then, our collective/distributive distinction doesn't cover the whole
range of logically valid inferences in the classical sense. Note that a situation
doesn't necessarily contain every fact there is, by definition ([5] exhibits a
similar conception of "collective reading").
'Similarly, (i) is bad probably because the couple's membership situation
(i.e. s 2 in (13)) is identified with the described situation.
(i) *The couple is nice people.
On the other hand, (ii) is not good either (at least) to American speakers.
(ii) The couple are nice people.
Probably this is due to the well-known difference between American and
British varieties of English. The dialectal difference probably means that
American speakers don't accept ATS shift as readily as British speakers,
while the theory requires ATS shift (both (i) and (ii) are not good for Amer-
ican speakers). However, without British informants, I can't say something
definite here (note that even in American English singular/plural alternation
occurs (cf. [8], p.70)).
9When I say that a pronoun agrees with its antecedent, I implicitly as-
sume my own analysis ([9] and [10]; see also [111) of pronouns as definite
descriptions. If we follow this analysis, then a pronoun exploits its an-
tecedent's ATS as its own resource situation (with [11], things will get more
complicated). However, assumption of such an analysis is not crucial here.
10 Here, some readers might be reminded of the following examples from
[12].
(i) a. Three defeats in a row was too much for our hero.
b. The defeats were/*was too much for our hero.
(ii) a. Hundred dollars is a lot of money for a TV dinner.
b. Those hundred dollars are/*is a lot, though.
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Our accounts for the contrast between (14) and (16) extends to (ia-b). As
for (iia), one obvious thing to say is that the subject is interpreted as an
amount. There will be several possible analyses for this (e.g. it could be a
subtle type of reference transfer, or we could assume a constraint saying that
n dollar bills in a situation can show up as an amount in another situation,
or we could assume its quasi-bare-plural status of the subject or its status
as a complex proper name (cf. [13]), etc.). I don't pursue this issue further
here.
'Based on this assumption one could construct an alternative, "seman-
tic" version of this analysis and say that the semantic values of the subjects
of (17a-b) are (ia-b) respectively.
(i) a. ,\x [doing-phonology-problems(x)] ED Ax [drinking-vodka(x)]
b. Ax [doing-phonology-problems(x) ® drinking-vodka(x)]
Our attack on the "syntactic" PRO analysis applies to this "semantic" ver-
sion too.
'Or its "semantic" version noted in n. 11.
13 Cf. [8]'s example (i).
(i) Steak and okra makes me sick.
"Probably this constraint is peculiar to English. In other languages non-
abstract nouns may be subject to similar constraints (see [7], p. 127, for a
Finnish example taken from a paper by Edith A. Moravcsik).
'For [8], (15)-(16) are simply "remaining puzzles" (p.87, fn.22). Also
note that [8] simply says that the subjects of (14b) and (17b) acquire singular
indices without specifying how.
16 0r its "semantic" version noted in n.11.
17 1 don't claim to have solved every problem about number agreement in
English (for example, I have nothing to say here about linear order, there-
construction, etc.). One of the remaining puzzles is the contrast, already
noted in a footnote in [1], between (8) and (i).
(i) Ken and Naomi are/is a good group.
That is, singular agreement is also possible when the postcopular noun is
group. At present I have no interesting solution to this puzzle.
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